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The influence of old-age retirement on health: Causal evidence from the 
Finnish register data
Kuusi, T., Martikainen, P., Valkonen, T.1
Abstract
We quantify the impact of old-age retirement on health using longitudinal Finnish register data for the period 
2000–2012. The data allows for a strict isolation of the effects of transition from work to retirement for both 
mental and physical health indicators. We use the lowest statutory eligibility age for full old-age pensions, 63 
years, as an instrument in FE-IV estimation to ensure causal inference. We find that (1) retirement at age 63 
moderately decreases the use of antidepressants, especially for women. The effect is sharp, while it is 
somewhat reversed in the later years; (2) the beneficial effects of retirement on the cardiovascular and 
musculoskeletal conditions are smaller and more diffused; (3) for occupational classes, our results show a 
reduction in antidepressant use for women in almost all occupations, whereas for men it is significant for 
manual workers and farmers; (4) we find stronger declines in the anti-depressant use among men and 
women who retire from low- and mid-income work, as well as more robust decrease in the risk of 
cardiovascular diseases for high-income and non-single; and (5) our test of external validity shows that the 
beneficial effects in antidepressant use can be extended to apply to most Finns retiring at ages 62–64. 
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1. Introduction
The current trend of declining old-age mortality rates has severely challenged the financial sustainability of 
the public pension schemes in almost all the high-income countries. A yet-unresolved question is how far the 
retirement ages can be increased without significant effects on the health of elderly workers and retirees; 
this is an issue of both individual welfare and public finances. While finding answers has been a goal of a large 
body of research literature, a great deal of uncertainty remains in the subject. The research designs are 
challenged by ambiguous direction of causality and heterogeneous, often unobserved characteristics of 
retirees. Furthermore, the empirical literature typically builds on local average treatment effects (LATE) that 
identify the treatment effects for only a minority of the retirees.
In this paper, we introduce new estimates for the health effects of retirement by using the individual Finnish 
population, retirement and health registers for the period 2000–2012. Our focus is on retirements after the 
2005 pension reform while the full data window allows us to control for the trend effects of ageing prior and 
after the retirement. We measure the influence of retirement on mental health through purchases of 
antidepressants and the impact of retirement on physical health by hospital visits associated with 
cardiovascular or musculoskeletal diseases. We show that our results are not likely to be subject of the typical 
identification problems in the literature, and thus provide a good benchmark of the health impacts of 
retirement.
The detailed data allows us to carefully analyse the characteristics of retirees. Our health data comprise 
information on all prescription medications and contacts with the hospital care system of the studied 
individuals. Therefore, we avoid the problems related to using self-assessed health measures and non-
response or loss to follow-up biases. Furthermore, we identify persons that have retired from full-time work 
to full retirement, with the aim of capturing all the key elements of the retirement transition (end of work, 
more leisure, less income). A caveat in the previous literature has been that the observed retirements often 
involve cases in which retirees have already ceased working due to unemployment or disability before 
retirement, or they may have continued working after starting to draw pensions. In these cases, results may 
be ambiguous due to large de facto heterogeneity in the key elements of retirement. Moreover, we observe 
the health outcomes for different income and socio-economic groups for which qualities of work and 
retirement from it may be very different.
We make use of the Finnish institutional set-up that is suitable for a quasi-experimental research design. In 
particular, we address the health–retirement endogeneity problem using the instrumental variable (IV) 
approach. The endogeneity problem arises because changes in health may also affect the decision to retire 
and this may easily result in biased estimates of the health effects of retirement. Following the recent 
literature, we use the lowest statutory eligibility age for full old-age pensions as an instrument for the actual 
retirement age. In the Finnish earnings-related first pillar old-age pension scheme, the statutory earliest full 
pension retirement age of 63 years provides particularly strong incentives for retirement from work to old-
age pension, and indeed it is the most common route out of labor markets. While the statutory age is a good 
predictor of the true retirement age during the studied period, it is not likely by itself to affect health. Thus, 
the lowest eligibility age provides a strong and valid instrument. 
The pension scheme at our focus dictates a large fraction of the retirement income and retirement decisions 
in Finland. Most of the individuals working in the private sector until old-age pension retired between the 
lower and the upper age limits of the flexible retirement window of 62–67 years in our data. There are simple 
rules for pension accrual and actuarial adjustment for postponing withdrawals. Moreover, the replacement 
rates and old-age poverty are on average OECD levels and thus, the Finnish system provides a framework for 
a representative case in terms of the income effects of retirement.
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Based on our analysis, we provide new and interesting findings on the effects of retirement. We show that 
retirement decreases the use of antidepressants, whereas the effect on physical conditions is smaller and 
more diverse. For socio-economical classes, our results show a reduction in antidepressant use for women 
in almost all occupations, whereas for men the effect is significant only for manual workers and farmers, 
while the effects are much smaller for the other occupational categories. Moreover, we find stronger declines 
in the anti-depressant use among men and women who retire from low- and mid-income work, as well as 
more robust decrease in the risk of cardiovascular diseases for men who work in the high-income jobs or 
whose family status is other than single. For women, we also find solid evidence that the risk of using 
antidepressants falls sharply after retirement, while the effect is somewhat reversed in the later years.
Moreover, our detailed data set allows us also to address the generalisability of our results. A key challenge 
of current retirement health literature is that IV methodology only provides the LATE at the exact eligibility 
age. Typically, a jump in the probability of retirement as a result of reaching the statutory age limit (the first 
stage) suggest that only minority of the population will comply with the rule – our study is no exception. As 
Figure 1 shows, in the Finnish case the increase in the probability of retirement due to reaching age 63 is at 
best around 30%, albeit that it is still a relatively strong effect when compared to the previous literature.2 As 
some people choose to retire before the statutory retirement age, and others who reach it forgo the 
possibility of retiring, the decision to retire provides a case of two-sided noncompliance. If there is evidence 
against the homogeneity of the expected (marginal) treatment effects in the population, the group of 
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Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of retirement in the Finnish private sector 2005-2012. The figure shows the average 
% of retirees in the group of persons who retire from work to old-age pension by age. Note: More information 
concerning the definition of the group is given in Section 3.
2 The figure shows the percentage of retirees in the group of persons that have a pure retirement transition from work 
to old-age pension (see Section 3 for definition), while the same also holds true for all old-age retirements.
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We test the heterogeneity of the marginal effects of retirement on our health variables by applying the 
framework proposed by Brinch et al. (2017) in different segments of the population. We compare the health 
outcomes of those who retire at 63 with those who retire later or earlier, and build a rejection test statistic 
for treatment homogeneity. 
Our general finding is that the homogeneity assumption can be rejected when comparing health outcomes 
far from the threshold age and if the time-invariant individual-level heterogeneity is not properly accounted 
for. Instead, in the age window of 62–64 years, and after considering the time-invariant effects, we do not 
find evidence against treatment homogeneity in the case of antidepressant use and hospital episodes due to 
musculoskeletal diseases. Thus, we can safely generalise our LATE results concerning these health outcome 
variables to the broader age window. This is important, as 68 % of retirements from work to old-age pensions 
occur at this age interval3.  On the other hand, we find some evidence suggesting that the effect of retirement 
on the cardiovascular hospital treatments is heterogeneous in a manner that may result in upward bias in 
the effect of retirement. Moreover, there are some socioeconomic groups for which the homogeneity of the 
treatment effect is rejected.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we take stock on the previous literature. Section 3 introduces 
our data, while Section 4 discusses our research methodology. In Section 5, we report our main results, and 
in Section 6 we address robustness of our results to different specifications and typical problems in statistical 
inference. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature
The impacts of retirement on health have long been studied in the public health literature. Two summarising 
surveys by Maimaris et al. (2010) and van der Heide et al. (2013) report that retirement is good for mental 
health. Instead, the results of studies on cognitive skills reported by Meng et al. (2017), or on physical health, 
vary both with sign and intensity.4
Health economists joined the research tradition later and contributed by emphasising causal analysis using 
quasi-experimental designs and their related methods (regression discontinuity, differences-in-differences 
and instrumental variables; see Charles 2004 and Heller-Sahlgren 2017). A replication study (Nishimura et al. 
2018) found that the choice of statistical methods and cofounders has a strong influence on the results.
The latter type of quasi-experimental studies shows that retirement effects are attenuated (Rohwedder and 
Willis 2010, Mazzonna and Perachhi 2012, Bonsang et al. 2012, Tumino 2016, Nishimura et al. 2017) or have 
no impact (Coe and Zamarro 2011, Coe et al. 2012, Kajitani et al. 2016) on cognitive skills. A replication study 
by Fonseca (2017) detects that controlling for country-specific differences strongly diminishes retirement 
effects. 
Results regarding mental health show that the impact of retirement is either positive (Atalay and Barrett 
2014, Zhu 2016, Kolodziej and Garcia-Gomez 2019, Oshio and Kan 2017, Belloni et al. 2016 [for men] and 
Mazzonna and Perachhi 2017 [for physically demanding jobs]) or is not significant (Behncke 2012, Coe and 
Zamarro 2011, Mokyr Horner and Cullen 2016). Heller-Sahlgren (2017) does not find immediate effects, but 
the long-term consequences are strongly negative. 
3 It is noteworthy that the number is very similar to the share (67%) of all old-age pension retirements at this age window 
in the corresponding time period.
4 Grossman’s (1972) human capital theory does not provide much help here. Investments in health do not increase 
wage income after retirement (only the consumption value of health remains), which reduces incentives to use time 
or money to this end. In contrast, retirement abolishes the cost of the investment in terms of lost wage income; the 
net effect is not known.
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The main result from the previous studies analysing the physical health effects of retirement is that health 
improves. Insler (2014) shows that health gets better in the USA. Atalay and Barrett (2014) and Zhu (2016) 
study Australian women and detect positive results on a wide selection of health indicators. Coe and Zamarro 
(2011) reach similar results with the European Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) 
data. 
Some recent studies have discovered different responses for different groups. Mazzonna and Peracchi (2017) 
find that health improves in physically demanding occupations, but in occupations where physical stress is 
low, retirement may damage health. Hessel (2016) reports that retirement is beneficial to physical health in 
all the other groups, but not for lower-educated women. Eibich (2015) detects that lower-educated 
individuals benefit from better physical health, but the estimate for mental health is not significant. Highly 
educated individuals experience the opposite results. Negative effects have also been detected. Behncke 
(2012) shows that retirement increases chronic conditions and weakens self-assessed health in the UK.
Most of the studies mentioned above use either self-assessed health or health indices calculated using survey 
data as response variables. Several studies that assess the effects of retirement on registered mortality have 
found no effects (Hernaes et al. 2013), Nielsen (2018) and Hagen (2018), but Fitzpatrick and Moore (2017) 
claim that retirement increases male mortality in the USA. On the other hand, Bloemen et al. (2017) and 
Hallberg et at. (2015) detected that early retirement lowers mortality. 
There is also a branch of literature that analyse the effects of retirement on health care use. The issue is 
relevant, fox example, when the effects of higher retirement ages on public finances are studied. A change 
in the use can stem from several reasons, such as a change in the access to care, lower opportunity costs of 
time used in health care investments after retirement, or the influence of retirement on health. The health 
effects of retirement are more likely to explain the change in health care use if the cause of the health care 
contact is severe illness or, correspondingly, if the measure of use is overnight stays in hospital instead of 
contacts to general practitioner. A change in access to primary care after retirement may emerge because 
of lost eligibility to employees’ health insurance, or, as in Finland, because of lost access to occupational 
health care.  
 Zhang et al. (2018) finds that health care use increases after retirement markedly in China, which is likely 
to be caused mainly by deteriorated health, but there is also indirect evidence on the influence of lower 
opportunity costs. Lucifora and Vigani (2018) observed that retirement increases the probability of visiting 
a doctor and the number of doctor’s visits. Bíró (2016) finds that the visits increase even conditional on 
health. On the other hand, Nielsen (2018) finds no effect of statutory or early retirement age on physical 
health measured with comorbidity or mortality in Danish register data but the use of the popular early 
retirement route seems to reduce general practitioner (GP) visits and hospitalisation in Denmark. Gorry, et 
al. (2018) found that health care use measured with several indicators decline after retirement in the U.S.A. 
Thus, the empirical evidence on the influence of lower opportunity costs is unclear and mixed with true 
changes in health.
Three recent studies focus on the impact of retirement on mental health using Finnish data. Oksanen et al. 
(2011) observe that employees who retire at the statutory age and those who retire early because of mental 
health problems reduce their purchases of antidepressants after retirement. Laaksonen et al. (2012) report 
a similar outcome for the use of antidepressants but an increased use of hypnotics and sedatives in the case 
of mental health-related retirement. There is no impact on medication use among old-age retirees.  Leinonen 
et al. (2013) observe no impact on the use of antidepressants around old-age retirement, but they find a 
decline in the use of antidepressants for those who retire early because of mental health reasons. These 
studies do not use quasi-experimental designs and related methods.
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The variation in the previous results listed above can arise from many sources. A comparison of recent studies 
is provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. These studies use dominantly either FE-IV models or regression 
discontinuity approach. Introducing individual fixed effects removes the time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics that may create a link between health and retirement. Correspondingly, use of IV-models or 
RDD analysis considers reverse causality. However, use of these methods often constraint the studied group 
to cover a small subpopulation, which limits the external validity of the results. 
In this article, we address several potential caveats in identifying causal effects that may result in differences 
between our and the earlier results. We use standard FE-IV methodology, which capitalize on the earliest full 
pension retirement age as instrument to true retirement. Our methodological contribution is to expand the 
external validity to the result to the ages when most of the Finns retire. We also run a large amount of 
robustness tests to show, for example that reaching age 63 does not indicate, per se, marked changes in the 
health outcomes, as shown by the analysis of persons that do not retire at that age. 
Our study is based on representative yearly individual panel data on objective health indicators, 
demographics, labour force status, socio-economic status, income and retirement scheme compiled from 
Finnish registers. The quality of data is high compared to most of the studies.
Measures of health vary in previous studies from self-assessed health and self-reported diseases to register-
based detailed diagnoses and from use of health services to mortality. Data may be collected biannually, as 
in SHARE, yearly, or in case of registers, even monthly. Our study uses yearly purchases of prescription 
medicines and over-night stays in hospital.
Measured retirement may be self-reported or register-based, take place early, or at a statutory age, and the 
working intensity before retirement varies. In many countries, it is also common to work while drawing a 
pension. As opposed to many of the previous papers, we can isolate the pure retirement transition from work 
to old-age pension. This group is the relevant one when we consider the health effects of a higher retirement 
age. For those who are not working until the statutory retirement age, transition to non-employment has 




This study is based on a linked register-based 11% random sample of the population residing in Finland at 
the end of any of the years between 2000–2012.   We study the effects of retirement on health after the 
2005 pension reform while the data window allows us to control for the trend effects of ageing prior and 
after the retirement.  The data originate from various registers covering the whole Finnish population. 
Sociodemographic data come from the Labour Market Data File maintained by Statistics Finland, data on 
hospital visits from the National Hospital Discharge Register held by the Finnish National Institute for Health 
and Welfare and information on purchases of prescription medication from retail pharmacies from the 
Finnish National Prescription Register held by the National Social Insurance Institution. We follow our study 
participants annually as many of the measurements – such as income – are only available on an annual basis. 
Statistics Finland use personal identification numbers to combine data from different registers; the register 
holders have approved the use of the data for scientific research. Data linkage is approved by Statistics 
Finland’s ethical committee and is performed using unique personal identification numbers available for all 
residents and then anonymised for research purposes. Statistics Finland has granted us permission to use the 
data for research (TK-53-1519-09).
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We restrict our study population to individuals born between 1939–1950 who are aged 50–73 years in the 
period 2000–2012, are residents of Finland, and retire in 2005 or later.. We chose the period to cover a period 
before and after the 2005 pension reform and age-groups to cover ageing workers some of whom we could 
also observe both before and after the normative retirement age of 63 years. We exclude individuals from 
the treatment group who (a) are not living in private households; (b) have preceding periods of disability, 
unemployment or other routes out of employment before the old-age retirement or continue to work after 
receiving pension5; or (c) have not worked in the private sector. Restricting the study population to those 
living in private households in Finland is a natural choice, as the remaining population is mainly in institutional 
care and thus the de facto changes in the key elements of retirement transition are expected to be missing. 
The conditions listed in (b) are set because of the aim to study old-age retirement from work. Public sector 
workers have been ruled out because of different retirement rules dominated in that sector during the study 
period. In particular, the private sector workers share a common lowest statutory eligibility age for full old-
age pensions, whereas in the public sector the rules are more ambiguous involving different retirement ages 
for different occupations.6
After the restrictions, our total sample includes 93,381 individuals and 1,148,465 observations over time. In 
total, 69,196 of the individuals retired during the study period (33,182 men and 36,014 women). Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics of our data for these people one year before their retirement.  Furthermore, 
we isolate a treatment group that experience a clean transition from work to old age retirement according 
to our criteria. The treatment group includes 17,635 people; it is restricted to those entering retirement from 
employment.
3.2. Health outcome data
We use annual indicator variables [0,1] for three different health outcomes. For each of the study years, we 
assess the purchases of any antidepressant, defined as Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical code N06A, except 
tricyclic medication (N06AA). Hospital visits are coded on the basis of the International Classification of 
Diseases 10th Revision. Cardiovascular diseases are defined as codes I00-I99 and musculoskeletal diseases as 
M00-M99. 
We believe our health measures are an improvement on most of the previous literature. First, as the 
measures are register-based they are not vulnerable to various self-report biases or missing information. 
Second, the hospital-based health indicators are based on information on over-night stays, thus avoiding 
many of the possible biases related to primary care utilisation. Third, all our indicators are likely to reflect 
more severe end of the assessed health problems. For example, even antidepressants are available only by 
prescription from a doctor after clinical assessment, and over-the-counter psychotropic medications are 
not available in Finland.  Fourth, retirement related income barriers to care are likely to be small in Finland. 
A large part of the prescription medication costs are reimbursed directly regardless of income level and all 
medication costs are reimbursed after exceeding an out-of-pocket payment ceiling. As a last resort those 
on small incomes can cover costs of medicines and healthcare through social assistance (Hämäläinen et al. 
2009). However, although the health problems we measure are significant, not everybody will seek 
treatment, and this tendency may be associated with relatively stable characteristics, such as sense of 
stigma or preference for self-sufficiency. To the extent that these factors are time invariant, they are 
controlled for in the individual fixed-effects design. 
5 In (b), we track whether a person has periods of disability or unemployment or has not worked more than six months 
in the year that preceded the retirement. We consider a person to continue working if there is at least one month of 
work in any year that followed retirement.
6 While we do not directly analyse the health effects of retirement in the public sector, it is notable that the private 
sector data involves several occupational groups for which work characteristics are similar to the public sector work.
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3.3. Socioeconomic status
Two indicators of socioeconomic status are used: occupational social class and individual taxable income. 
Occupational social class is based on the current main occupation before retirement and classified into seven 
categories: (1) upper non-manual, (2) lower non-manual independent work, (3) lower non-manual routine 
work, (4) specialised manual work, (5) non-specialised manual work, (6) manual work with unspecified degree 
of specification (7) farmer, (8) other entrepreneur, (9) student and (10) unidentified. We have excluded in 
our econometric study people from small unidentified classes and students and aggregated the data so that 
it separates non-manual and manual work only. The information on individual taxable income originate from 
the tax records and incorporated wages, capital income and taxable income transfers. Income is also 















Men 33,182 9,178 5.4% 3.8% 2.8%
   Upper non-manual 5,749 1,887 6.5% 3.1% 2.4%
   Lower non-manual independent 5,038 1,544 5.5% 3.3% 2.7%
   Lower non-manual dependent 1,109 269 6.4% 3.1% 2.7%
   Specialised manual 8,219 1,864 5.1% 4.2% 3.0%
   Non-specialised manual 5,838 1,348 4.7% 3.6% 2.6%
   Manual, unidentified spec. 791 0 5.7% 5.6% 1.6%
   Farmer 2,398 678 4.2% 3.7% 2.9%
   Other entrepreneur 3,541 1,588 4.9% 4.6% 3.7%
   Student 339 0 10.6% 2.9% 1.5%
   Other, unidentified 160 0 9.4% 6.3% 2.5%
Women 36,014 8,457 9.5% 2.1% 3.3%
   Upper non-manual 4,964 1,205 10.7% 1.7% 2.9%
   Lower non-manual independent 8,502 2,321 9.4% 2.3% 3.0%
   Lower non-manual dependent 6,782 1,497 10.5% 2.0% 3.6%
   Specialised manual 2,866 461 8.8% 2.1% 3.6%
   Non-specialised manual 7,545 1,785 8.6% 2.3% 3.3%
   Manual, unidentified spec. 639 0 11.3% 2.7% 3.1%
   Farmer 1,895 342 6.9% 2.6% 4.1%
   Other entrepreneur 2,263 846 9.4% 1.7% 3.1%
   Student 403 0 13.6% 2.0% 4.2%
   Other, unidentified 155 0 12.9% 4.5% 2.6%
Total 69,196 17,635 7.5% 2.9% 3.1%
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. Note: Total obs. is the total amount of people in the data measured one year before their retirement 
and separately reported for each socioeconomic group. The treatment obs. variable shows the number of retirements that are 
qualified as clean transformations from full-time work to retirement, again measured one year before retirement. Users of antideps 
is the share of people using antidepressants one year before retirement, while the hospital period variables indicate the share of 
people that were subjected to a treatment period in hospital in the year before their retirement.
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3.4 Description of institutions
The Finnish public pension system consists of tax-financed basic pensions (a national pension and a guarantee 
pension) and statutory earnings-related pensions that employers and employees finance. Second-pillar 
occupational pensions and individual pensions play a marginal role. This improves the accuracy of our study, 
as the earliest eligibility age for full pension in the earnings-related pension scheme becomes a strong 
predictor for retirement. 
The 2005 pension reform gradually removed popular early retirement schemes and adopted a flexible old-
age retirement scheme for those aged 62–67 for both genders. It introduced early retirement at age 62, but 
with a heavy cut in pensions except for those who were long-term unemployed. Postponing withdrawal of 
pension was rewarded after age 63 in a way that was considered to be actuarial on average. In the public 
sector, some of the pre-existing occupational and personal retirement ages remained intact for the older 
generations. 
The retirement peak, which before was seen at ages 60 and 65, moved to age 63; further, retirement directly 
from work to an old-age pension gradually became a rule rather than an exception7. Apart from the changes 
in the pension system rules, the falling disability incidence rate and employees’ increasing average 
educational level also contributed to the higher employment rates of the retiring baby boom generations. 
In order to generate a clean research frame, we chose to study retirement after 2005 for old-age pensions at 
ages 62–67 in the private sector. Since we focus on the direct transition from work to old-age pensions, we 
skip those individuals who were unemployed or disabled before their retirement, or who for other reasons 
were not working, since they do not see any change in the work/leisure margin and experience little change 
in their income. As an example, including disability pensioners – who in Finland are automatically transferred 
to old-age pension at their statutory full pension retirement age – in the old age pension after turning 63 
would improve the first stage results of IV, but it would distort the estimates of the health effects of retiring 
from work. We also removed those who continue to work while receiving a pension from the data for the 
same reason. The rules for old-age pension remained the same during the research period of 2005–2012.
In addition to the details of the pension system, access to health care may also have important implications 
for the results. Almost all employees are eligible to use free occupational health care, which in many cases 
also provides medical treatment. This allows them to bypass the long queues at public health care centres. 
In addition to causing discomfort, waiting time may also reduce labour income. After retirement, this route 
ceases to exist. Therefore, any attempt to use number of visits to health care centres as an indicator of health 
is likely to bias the results, showing a weakening of health after retirement.
4. Research design
The analysis faces several challenges that arise above all from unobserved heterogeneity at the individual 
level. Individuals are different, for example, in terms of their health, environment and preferences toward 
retiring. Moreover, there are factors that may affect both health and the decision to retire, and the decision 
to retire may reflect changes in health rather than vice versa. Without controlling these factors, the statistical 
analysis may lead into biased or inefficient estimates. For example, if the decision to retire is made 
systematically after a negative change in health status, it is likely that the results will indicate that the 
7 Basically, using data on the reform of 2005 would have provided additional information on the individuals who retire 
because of becoming eligible. But the multitude of early retirement schemes and occupation and industry specific 
differences in normal retirement ages prevailing before the reform of suggest that individuals were faced with very 
different incentives to retire (occupation, sector, health, birth year, year when working career started, etc.) and were 
also likely to differ in terms of their unobserved characteristics. The retirement peaks in ages 60 and 65 were also 
small to be used in the analysis, and the ones who worked until age 65 were strongly selected.
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retirement has a negative effect on health in the absence of controlling for the direction of the causality. That 
may conceal the true, positive effects of the retirement, if they exist.
We use an individual fixed-effects IV design. The idea is, as is common in the recent literature, to use the 
lowest statutory eligibility age for full old-age pensions as an instrument. It is a good predictor of the true 
retirement age in Finland, and it is not likely that the statutory retirement age correlates with health. 
Therefore, we expect the statutory retirement age to provide a strong instrument for the true retirement 
year. 
The discontinuity caused by the statutory age act as instruments for individuals’ employment status in a 2SLS 
model, with age as the continuous variable determining the discontinuities (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Imbens 
and Wooldridge 2009). In the formulation of the framework, we follow Heller-Sahlgren (2017). Let us denote 
the retirement with the variable  – it receives a value of 1 if the person has retired – otherwise, it receives 𝑟𝑖𝑡
a value of 0. Then, , the probability of the treatment ( ), can be expressed as a piecewise continuous 𝑃 𝑟𝑖 = 1
function of the age above and below the threshold,  (in our case 63 years): 𝑠𝑝𝑖
𝑃(𝑟𝑖 = 1|𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖) = {𝑓1(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 ≥ 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑓0(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖) 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 < 𝑠𝑝𝑖, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑓1(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖) ≠ 𝑓0(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖),                                     (1)
We expect that , that is, that the probability of retirement increases after the person 𝑓1(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖) > 𝑓0(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖)
has reached the statutory eligibility age. We typically assume f to be either a linear or quadratic function of 
age, depending on the size of the estimation window.
In quadratic form, our estimation equations are
𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 ― 1 +  𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡          (2),
and
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 1 +  𝛼2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,    (3),
where  is an indicator variable that receives a value of 1 if  and receives a value of 0 when 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑠𝑝𝑖 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
.  When the estimation is done locally at the window (statutory retirement age – 1, statutory retirement < 𝑠𝑝𝑖
age + 1), we instead use only a single linear aging trend around the discontinuity generated by the legislation 
( ).𝛽3,𝛽4,𝛽5,𝛼3,𝛼4,𝛼5 = 0
Similar to Heller-Sahlgren's (2017) notation,  is the prediction of  from the first stage, with  𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 1 𝑟𝑖𝑡 ― 1 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 ― 1
used as an excluded instrument.8 Thus, our baseline model estimates the average effect of retirement to on 
the different health variables at in the years that follows the year of retirement and after that.9 We use the 
year- and person-fixed effects,  and , respectively, during the estimation; we also use a quadratic trend 𝜔𝑡 𝛾𝑖
effect of aging on the health outcome. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that the person-specific 
heterogeneity in the effect of the retirement is likely to cause dependence in the error terms at the individual 
level; thus, the estimator should be chosen in a manner that is consistent with the clusters in the errors, .𝜖𝑖𝑡
8 Our instrument is likely to fulfil the relevance condition (retirement concentrates strongly at age 63), exclusion 
condition (the statutory lowest eligibility age influences health only through retirement) and monotonicity condition 
(the statutory retirement age only increases actual retirement). The results provide the local average treatment effect 
(i.e. the impact of retirement on health for those who retire from work because of reaching age 63).
9 This is because the amount of work that a person has done during his or her retirement year can vary, and it is not 
clearly specified in our data. Our data show how many working months occur during a person’s final year, but some of 
them may constitute paid vacations that people often save to use at the end of their working careers. In our robustness 
analysis, we, however, show that our main results remain similar when we analyse the contemporaneous effects of 
retirement, that is, we use the prediction of  from the first stage, with  used as an excluded instrument.𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡
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The estimation design bears resemblance to the standard fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD). 
However, the focus is on the variation within individuals across time rather than the variation between 
individuals (see Heller-Sahlgren 2017; Eibich 2015; Lemieux and Milligan 2008; Petterson-Lidbom 2012). 
Individual-level fixed effects are included in the model, and as a result, the identification assumptions are 
different. A traditional fuzzy RDD would hinge on the assumption that people who are on different sides of, 
but close to, the statutory age limit only differ in terms of the probability of being retired, once the flexibly 
for the direct impact of age is controlled for. Instead, the individual fixed-effects IV estimator hinges on the 
assumption that merely crossing the threshold serving as an instrument does not impact an individual’s 
health around the threshold apart from via retirement (Heller-Sahlgren 2017).
 represents the difference in the probability of treatment between the control group and the treatment 𝛽1
group. The difference is often called the first stage; it gives an estimate of the impact of reaching the 
retirement age on the fraction of treated individuals. Typically, the research generates a LATE – that is 




Despite its conceptual appeal, the IV method is not without problems. First, under-identification of the 
instruments may occur, which means that some or all the instruments are irrelevant, as they are not sufficient 
to identify the relationship between the endogenous regressors and the explained variable. Weak 
identification arises when the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but only 
weakly. Estimators can perform poorly when instruments are weak (see Stock and Yogo [2005] for further 
discussion).10
However, even when the standard tests reject weakness of the instrument, the external validity of the LATE 
may be violated when is small and there is evidence against the homogeneity of the expected marginal 𝛽1
treatment effects in the population. In this case, the group is selected and the selection matters for the 
outcome.
Our analysis suggests that one should be very careful when interpreting the results of studies that use the 
statutory retirement age as an instrument. That is because in most of the study settings continuing to work 
until the statutory retirement age may not be common and this may lead to a partial selection of exposure 
to retirement (of treatment). Some people choose to retire before the retirement age, and others who 
continue to work forgo the possibility of retiring at the statutory age. Thus, the research design is quasi-
experimental, with two-sided noncompliance (Brinch et al. 2017). In the general terminology of Angrist, 
Imbens, and Rubin (1996), the treated (retired) persons consists of compliers whose behavior is affected by 
the binary instrument at hand (crossing the age threshold), but also always-takers who are treated (retired) 
irrespective of whether the instrument is switched off or on (the age threshold is crossed). The untreated 
(not retired) persons are likewise composed of compliers and never-takers, where the latter group avoids 
treatment even when the instrument is switched on, I.e. the age threshold is crossed. 
In the current retirement literature, there is typically only a small increase in the probability of entering 
retirement at reaching the statutory age, i.e. the share of those who retire at 63 because of the instrument. 
The typical values of the first stage estimate of the increase of probability due to reaching the threshold age 
10 In the estimations and statistical testing, we use the xtivreg2 module for Stata by Schaffer (2010). The under-
identification test is an LM test of whether the rank of the matrix of reduced form coefficients is smaller than the 
dimensionality of the problem. Under the null condition, the statistic is distributed as chi-squared, and a rejection of 
the null indicates that the matrix is of full-column rank (i.e. the model is identified, and the rejection is based on the 
Kleibergen-Paap [2006] rk statistic). In addition, we use the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic with the degrees of 
freedom adjustment for the rk statistic following the standard small-sample adjustment for cluster–robust standard 
errors.
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are well below 0.5. While   the IV estimation provides an unbiased estimate of the LATE of the treated, the 
larger the problem of noncompliance, the harder it is to know how well the result generalises to the larger 
population. When the share of those who react to the instrument is only a small fraction of the total 
population, it is a particular group that may be especially prone to either the positive or negative health 
effects of retirement.
The novelty of this paper is that we test the homogeneity of the treatment effect by resorting to Brinch et 
al.’s (2017) proposed method. The test of external validity combines several test statistics that compare the 
outcomes of intervened and non-intervened people in groups that are similar in their treatment status. 
Intuitively, if the outcomes differ in these groups, the population has heterogeneous marginal treatment 
effects as a response to the intervention (the eligibility age. This would invalidate the generality of the LATE 
outside the complier group. 
We focus on investigating the generality of our results within a narrow age window surrounding the earliest 
eligibility age. Generalisations of the results even in the closest age interval of 62–64 is relevant because the 
majority of the Finnish private sector employees retire from work at this age. 
Taking the [62,64] age window as a reference, our first test statistic measures the difference in the average 
untreated health outcomes between compliers (at age 62, just below the eligibility age and those who retire 
at 63) and those who have turned 63 but will retire at 64. Because it compares the untreated outcomes, the 
test statistic can be referred to as the untreated outcome test statistic.  If the statistic is different from zero, 
it is a sign of selection heterogeneity: There is a difference in the health outcomes of the untreated that is 
associated with the instrument-induced selection of treatment. Those who have preferences against 
retirement, indicated by postponing it, are different from the compliers. 
The analogous treated outcome test statistic measures the difference in average outcomes of those aged 62 
and retired in the same year, and those aged 63 and retired at 63). If the statistic is different from zero, it is 
again a sign of selection heterogeneity. The instrument-induced selection, as reflected by the change in 
treatment probability, shows up as a difference in the outcomes of the treated (i.e. retired). Those who have 
preferences toward taking the treatment (early) are different from those retired at 63.
Formally, we define the untreated and treated test statistics,  and  respectively, as follows:Δ0 Δ1,
Δ0 = 𝐸[ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡|𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 63 ,𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡 64] ― 𝐸[ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡|𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 62 , 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡 63]
= Δ𝑎𝑔𝑒 + Δ0𝐸[𝛾𝑖] + Δ0𝐸[𝜖𝑖𝑡]      (5)
Δ1 = 𝐸[ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡|𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 63 ,𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡 63] ― 𝐸[ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡|𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 62 ,𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡 62]
= Δ𝑎𝑔e + Δ1𝐸[𝛾𝑖] + Δ1𝐸[𝜖𝑖𝑡]      (6)
We trivially decompose the test statistics into several effects: (1) the mean effect of aging,  which we Δ𝑎𝑔𝑒,
define -without any loss of generality - to be common within any individual group for which the estimation 
is conducted; (2) the mean time-invariant differences in the health outcomes between the groups,  Δ𝐸[𝛾𝑖];
and (3) the mean differences in the model’s idiosyncratic errors that capture the heterogeneity of the 
changes in the health status of treated and untreated. We note that the test statistics ultimately boils down 
to analysing the heterogeneity in term (3) while we include term (1) merely to reflect the structure of the 
model that uses discontinuity caused by the statutory age in the age profile of health as means to analyse 
the effect of retirement.
Our test statistic of external validity compares the size of the treated and untreated test statistics, , Δ1 ― Δ0
and it rejects the null hypothesis of treatment effect homogeneity if the untreated outcome test statistic is 
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not equal to the treated outcome test statistic.11 Those who have preferences toward or against taking the 
treatment are different in their health outcomes. The treatment effect homogeneity is also a test for external 
validity because the LATE can only be externally valid if the treatment effect is homogeneous. If the treatment 
effect is homogeneous, then the treated outcome test and the untreated outcome test only reflect selection. 
If instead, the two test statistics are different, there is selection to the treatment and the treatment effect is 
not homogeneous. Then, the LATE is not externally valid.
Formally, the test statistics can be written as:
Δ1 ― Δ0 = (Δ1𝑎𝑔𝑒 ― Δ0𝑎𝑔𝑒) + (Δ1𝐸[𝛾𝑖] ― Δ0𝐸[𝛾𝑖]) + (Δ1𝐸[𝜖𝑖𝑡] ― Δ0𝐸[𝜖𝑖𝑡]),             (7),
where the first term (the within-group age profile of health) is expected to be zero, the second term captures 
the differences in the time-invariant health outcomes, and the last term captures the time-variant 
heterogeneity. If the third term is not 0, the test statistics indicate a rejection of the homogeneous treatment 
effects. The test can be employed using standard t-testing. Furthermore, the hypothesis that the test 
statistics for several groups are jointly not different from zero can be studied using the F-statistics. 
To build further intuition behind the test statistics of external validity, we note that it essentially measures 
the effect of having a stronger instrument on the LATE. The stronger instrument increases the number of 
compliers and decreases the number of both the never takers and always takers. Brinch et al. (2017) shows 
that under the standard IV assumption of conditional independence and monotonicity, the marginal effect 
of increasing the number of compliers on the LATE due to a decrease in the amount of never takers is 
proportional to  Similarly, the marginal effect of increasing the number of compliers on the LATE due ― Δ0.
to a decrease in the amount of always takers is proportional to . In particular, the conditional independence Δ1
of the instrument of the idiosyncratic error terms,  implies that the strengthening of the instrument does 𝜖𝑖𝑡,
not change the third term in Equation 7; therefore, the extrapolation of the test statistics on the larger 
complier group is valid. Under the (local) linearity of the effects, the proportionalities are the same; 
therefore, it follows from  that the LATE remains the same even when the number of compliers Δ1 ― Δ0 = 0
increases.12
Access to the test statistics allows us to test different ways of avoiding heterogeneity of the effects in the 
quasi-experimental design.  As compared to the earlier work by Heller-Sahlgren (2017) that uses waves of 
survey data with irregular frequency, our annual data provide more detailed information about the date of a 
person’s retirement and his or her health outcomes. This allows us to construct the test statistic, as we can 
isolate the exact year of retirement as well as the health outcomes prior, at the time and after the retirement. 
Furthermore, we have access to a long time series of personal health outcomes that allows us to properly 
control for person-level fixed effects. Furthermore, we can tackle heterogeneity by controlling the 
individuals’ observable characteristics and by studying the effects of the retirement separately for different 
groups. We also consider matching in order to balance the data with respect to observable characteristics.
In addition, we aim to avoid other common pitfalls of the previous IV studies based on regression 
discontinuity design. We allow the impact of age to differ on each side of the retirement discontinuities used 
11 This is a sign of treatment heterogeneity under the assumption that the functions that specify how treated and 
untreated outcomes vary with the fraction of the treated P are linear. 
12 We acknowledge that the MTE might be non-linear in some occasions. We note that Brinch et al. (2017) also 
proposes a version of the test statistic that generalizes to monotonic MTE but at the expense of losing statistical 
power. We motivate the use of more powerful test by the fact that we mainly apply the test in a small age window 
around the eligibility age in which case the linear model is likely to provide us with a reasonable approximation of the 
MTEs.
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as instruments (Lee and Lemieux 2010), and we study the sensitivity of the findings by narrowing the range 
of the data analysed around the retirement discontinuities (Angrist and Pischke 2015) in order to explore the 
non-linear effects of statutory retirement age or the results’ sensitivity to the specific data range. Instead of 
using survey data, we employ yearly register-based panel data to identify both the date of retirement and 
changes in health outcomes. 
We pay special attention to the definition of retirement and the statutory retirement age. In most previous 
research instruments are constructed from both regular and early retirement ages, which neglects potential 
self-selection into jobs where individuals are more likely to be able to retire early (Heller-Sahlgren 2017). 
Furthermore, working intensity before retirement varies. In terms of the institutional setup, it is often unclear 
which statutory retirement age threshold applies to which segment of the population and at what age. 
Asserting discontinuities at retirement ages without knowing whether any clear incentives for retirement can 
induce additional measurement errors.
Finally, it is worth noticing that many of the recent studies have used pension reforms to isolate the group 
that retires because of becoming eligible to pension. Those who are not affected by the reform (because of 
age, occupation, gender, etc.) are in the control group. This setup may help to overcome some of the 
problems concerning the identification, as the discontinuities can generate clear incentives for retirement 
across narrow age windows. Another useful aspect of the reforms is that one can observe age profiles of 
health outcomes prior to the reform. On the other hand, the reform approach is not without problems. It still 
compares health outcomes of different persons over time, and thus the risk of selection remains especially 
when the take-up of utilizing the discontinuities is typically relatively low. Moreover, the reform approach 
builds on the comparison of few cohorts at the vicinity of the discontinuity. The reform also generates other 
outcomes, such as change in incomes, that can influence health.
In our case, separation of the compliers from the control group is based on their retirement choices, when 
the earliest full pension retirement age is reached. With this method, it is more likely that the group that 
retires at age 63 includes also some who retire because of other reasons than becoming eligible. On the other 
hand, using the fixed retirement age allows us to follow the retirement behavior of eight successive birth 
cohorts and draw conclusions on wider data. Moreover, even with a single threshold, it is possible to use 
"Placebo" approach to study whether there are general health changes around the age threshold for persons 
who do not retire at that age.
5. Results
We start by considering the aggregate effect of retirement on health. Table 2 shows the fixed effects panel 
regression estimates for the effect of retirement on our health variables after controlling for the individual- 
and year-level effects. The results suggest that the correlation that arises from the individual-level variation 
in the retirement status and the health outcomes relatively low. It appears that retirement does to some 
extent positively affect the health status of the treatment group relative to the health status of the same-
aged control group for the same year, but the results may be biased due to endogeneity problems.
Use of antidepressants Hospital periods (cardiovascular) Hospital periods (musculoskeletal)
Retirement -0.0052*** -0.0030** -0.0064*’
 (0.0018) (0.000838) (0.000835)
Observations 210,465 210,465 210,465
Number of individuals 17,635 17,635 17,635
Table 2. Fixed-effects panel estimation of the aggregate effect of retirement on health. The coefficient of the retirement variable 
denotes the average effect of retirement to the health variable at the year that follows the retirement and after that. In the results, -
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0.01 denotes a 1 percentage point decrease in the risk of using antidepressants or facing a hospital period when retired. Robust 
standard errors for heterogeneity and person-level clusters in the error terms in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Other 
control variables: year- and individual-specific fixed effects and step-wise quadratic aging trend.
We then repeat the estimation using the IV methodology in Equations 1 to 3. The results in Table 3 suggest 
that especially the impact on the use of antidepressant becomes statistically and economically significant. 
The results reported on the line ‘LATE’ suggest that retirement decreases the probability of using 
antidepressants by -3.05 percentage points. We find a smaller but still statistically significant effect on the 
risk of facing a hospital period due to a musculoskeletal disease or a cardiovascular disease; another finding 
that only becomes apparent after using the IV estimation. 
While we do not explicitly model the determinants of the difference between methodologies, the likeliest 
reason is the reverse causality. The decision to retire is affected by negative health shocks; therefore, in 
absence of controlling for it, the decreasing effect of retirement on the use of antidepressants per se is 
muted. In terms of identification, it should be noted that we control for quadratic aging trends for each health 
variable; we estimate the effect of aging to be almost linear. We also find that the under-identification and 
the weak identification tests fail to reject the instrument’s relevance and robustness.13
To further characterise the results, we report the reduced-form estimates of the effect of turning 63. The 
reduced-form model uses the same controls as the IV estimation. We find that turning 63 reduces the risk of 
using antidepressants roughly by 1 percentage point and the risk of a hospital period due to musculoskeletal 
disease by 0.5 percentage points. The reduced form is the IV estimate as weighted by the first stage, and it 
can be used to compare the overall feasibility of the model’s predictions as relative to the corresponding 
changes in the average health outcomes in our sample of treated persons. We further illustrate the 
predictions of the reduced-form model and their uncertainty in Figures 4–6 in the Appendix. We show that 
the decline in the reduced-form estimates fits well with the actual changes in health outcomes in the sample, 
and the model also provides reasonable counterfactual dynamics for health outcomes in the absence of the 








LATE, α1/β1 -0.0305*** -0.0080* -0.0163***
SE 0.0050 0.0048 0.0053
First stage
Pr jump, β1 0.3223*** 0.3223*** 0.3223***
SE 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039
F-statistic 6877 6877 6877
Reduced form
Effect of turning 63, α1 -0.0098*** -0.0026 -0.0053***
SE 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017
13 We find that the p-values for rejecting the under-identification are very close to 0, while the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk 
F-statistic concerning the weakness of the instruments is of an order of magnitude higher than the benchmark critical 
values that Stock and Yogo (2005) provide. While in most cases, Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical values are not directly 
applicable due to our specification that does not impose i.i.d. errors, the large size of the F-statistics as compared to the 
standard critical values, and the rejection of weak identification in the first stage results indicates the lack of weak 
identification.
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N (obs) 210,465 210,465 210,465
N (people) 17,635 17,635 17,635
Table 3. The benchmark IV estimation of the aggregate effect of retirement on health. In the results, -0.01 denotes a 1 percentage 
point decrease in the risk of using antidepressants or facing a hospital period when retired. Robust standard errors for heterogeneity 
and person-level clusters in the error terms in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Other control variables: year- and 
individual-specific fixed effects and step-wise quadratic aging trend.
We then analyse the effect more closely in Table 4 by repeating the IV estimation separately for different 
groups while still controlling for the aging effects and the appropriateness of our instruments (Figures 8-10 
show the reduced-form fit of these models to the data in case of different occupational social classes and 
sexes). It should be noted that in each alternative specification, we fail to show that the instruments would 
be weak or irrelevant, whereas the aging trends remain close to linear. The first stage results are available in 
Table A2 in the Appendix.
Our results show a reduction in antidepressant use for women in almost all occupations, whereas for men 
the effect only is significant for manual workers and farmers, while the effects are much smaller for the other 
occupational categories. We also analysed the influence of retirement on the risk of requiring hospital 
treatment to cardiovascular diseases. The results are much weaker; we find that retirement only decreases 
this risk for individuals in a few of the socioeconomic groups. The beneficial effect of retirement on individuals 
with musculoskeletal problems is evident in non-manual work and in dependent non-manual work of both 
sexes.
Second stage
Use of antidepressants Hospital periods (cardiovascular) Hospital periods (musculoskeletal)
LATE, α1/β1 SE LATE, α1/β1 SE LATE, α1/β1 SE
MEN Non-manual -0.0024 0.0103 0.0098 0.0115 -0.0244** 0.0107
Manual -0.0222*** 0.008 -0.0138 0.0105 -0.0155 0.0105
Farmer -0.0731* 0.0375 -0.0983* 0.0503 0.0244 0.0433
(Other) entrepreneur -0.0074 0.0126 -0.019 0.0177 0.0004 0.0138
WOMEN Non-manual -0.0362*** 0.0119 -0.0051 0.0083 -0.0197* 0.0112
Manual -0.0685*** 0.0148 -0.0075 0.011 -0.0292* 0.016
Farmer -0.0887 0.0544 -0.0248 0.0475 0.0623 0.0648
(Other) entrepreneur -0.0472* 0.0244 0.0031 0.0198 0.005 0.0259
MEN Single -0.019 0.0168 0.0203 0.021 -0.0223 0.0179
Non-single -0.013** 0.0061 -0.0156** 0.0077 -0.0137* 0.0073
WOMEN Single -0.0725*** 0.0208 -0.0147 0.013 -0.0165 0.0178
Non-single -0.0383*** 0.0092 -0.0034 0.0072 -0.0188* 0.0101
MEN Income ≥ 75% -0.0002 0.0189 -0.0481* 0.0258 -0.0257 0.0183
75% > income ≥ 50% -0.0105 0.019 -0.0357 0.0245 -0.0182 0.0222
50% > income ≥ 25% -0.034*** 0.0106 0.0055 0.0132 -0.0019 0.0127
25% > income -0.0044 0.0078 -0.0086 0.0096 -0.0211** 0.0091
WOMEN Income ≥ 75% -0.038 0.0304 0.0088 0.0236 0.0393 0.028
75% > income ≥ 50% -0.053*** 0.0168 -0.0027 0.0112 -0.0002 0.0146
50% > income ≥ 25% -0.0498*** 0.0127 -0.0102 0.0098 -0.0368*** 0.0135
25% > income -0.0461** 0.0193 -0.0045 0.013 -0.0189 0.0199
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Table 4. The effect of retirement on health by group. Note: Robust standard errors for heterogeneity and person-level clusters in the 
error terms in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. In the results, -0.01 denotes a 1 percentage point decrease in the risk of 
using antidepressants or facing a hospital period when retired. Other control variables: year- and individual-specific fixed effects and 
step-wise quadratic aging trend.
We again illustrate the reduced-form estimates of the effect of turning 63 by showing the predictions of the 
reduced-form model and their uncertainty in Figures 4–6 in the Appendix; we also show the model’s 
counterfactual dynamics for the health outcomes in the absence of turning 63. Table 4 indicates which of the 
differences between the counterfactual and the actual dynamics are statistically significant. 
In order to better understand the results, we have repeated the estimations by decomposing the effect of 
retirement by personalising the effect of retirement results, including his or her income and family status 
(see Table 4). In particular, we report the results based on the division of the effect into income quantiles. 
They show that the women’s antidepressant use decreases particularly strongly in the lowest income 
quartiles, whereas for men, the effect is strongest at the lower-middle-income quartile. In case of the result 
for women, it should be noted that the results may partly be weakened by heterogeneity of the treatment 
effect, as discussed in Section 6. Finally, the risk of facing a hospital period due to a musculoskeletal disease 
lowers especially in the lower-income quantiles. 
We find that the results in the low end of the income distribution are intuitive. Ultimately, our approach 
builds on the economic incentives that the pension system generates for postponing retirement. The large 
effect on the low-income quantiles suggest that there may be a stronger trade-off between economic 
benefits of continuing at work and weaker health outcomes in these socioeconomic groups. That is, it may 
be that the large negative income effect of retirement prior to the lowest eligibility age has led some low-
income retirees to wait for this age even as they face more adverse health effects of continuing at work than 
the retirees in other income groups.
When we study the retirement effects for alternative family status, the findings suggest that the positive 
health effects are more concentrated in people that are non-single. This holds true especially for men: non-
single men gain in each of the analysed health fields. The effect is substantial also for single women, but the 
generalisability of this result, is brought into question by the possibility of selection in Section 6. While these 
results still reflect the positive effect of retirement, they also seem to interestingly suggest that there are 
potentially negative, compensating effects for some risk groups such as single men. For them, the key 
elements of retirement transition, such as increased leisure time and decrease in social activity, may result 
in more adverse health outcomes.
In order to further clarify the gender effects, we repeat our analysis for women and men in the specifications 
“The aggregate effect on men” and “The aggregate effect on women” in Table A3 in the Appendix. Especially 
in case of the use of antidepressants, the effects strike as stronger for women consistently with the evidence 
presented above. 
All in all, our results support the positive mental effect of retirement found in the previous literature (Atalay 
and Barrett 2014, Zhu 2016, Oshio and Kan 2017). However, at the finer level there are some differences. In 
contrast to Belloni et al. (2016) who find the strongest results for men, we find that the mental effects are 
the strongest for women, albeit we also observe the positive effect for men. In case of men, we find that 
mental health improves for manual jobs in line with Mazzonna and Peracchi (2017), whereas for women the 
effect is more unified across socio-economic groups than their results would suggest.
In line with a few previous studies, our results show that the physical effects of retirement are health 
improving (Insler 2014; Atalay and Barrett 2014; Zhu 2016; Coe and Zamarro 2011). At more detailed level, 
Mazzonna and Peracchi (2017) find that health improves in physically demanding occupations, but in 
occupations where physical stress is low, retirement may weaken health. Our findings suggest that there are 
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also significant effects for the non-manual workers. Correspondingly with the finding by Eibich (2015) which 
indicates that lower-educated individuals benefit from better physical health, we find that the positive effect 
is especially strong in the lowest-income socioeconomic groups. We, however, observe the positive effect 
for both physical and mental health.
6. Robustness analysis
We next subject our empirical results to a battery of robustness tests. To summarize them, we find that the 
result that retirement decreases the probability of using antidepressants appears to be robust, while for the 
other health variables, the results are smaller and more mixed in terms of their statistical robustness.
6.1. Selection to treatment
In this subsection, we investigate whether selection could be a driving force behind our results. We first 
consider the external validity of our results and then we conduct more traditional testing based on the use 
of additional health variables and a matching algorithm. 
The analysis is important because reaching the statutory retirement age leads to only partial selection of 
retirement. Some people choose to retire before the retirement age, and others who reach it forgo the 
possibility of retiring. In absence of homogeneity of the expected marginal treatment effects in the 
population, the group of 63-year-old persons who retire due to the effect of the instrument, is selected and 
the selection matters for the outcome, even when the standard tests of the validity of instrument are passed. 
While we do not explicitly observe those persons, who do retire because of our eligibility age instrument, a 
useful first look on their characteristics is provided by observing persons who retire at 63 as compared to 
others. 
The comparison is reported in Appendix Table A4. The table collects the shares of different socioeconomic 
classes in the two groups and compares their health outcomes one year before the retirement. At the 
aggregate level we find that the health outcomes are relatively similar, the most visible difference being the 
moderately higher frequency of antidepressant use in the group that retires at 63. A closer inspection 
suggests that the group that retires at 63 is typically younger at the year of retirement, and in this group the 
share of men is higher. There is more frequent use of antidepressants especially among women, and the 
distributions of the socio-economic groups are somewhat different. A notable feature is that the share of 
single women in the group that retires at age 63 is smaller than in the group that does not retire at age 63. 
While the differences are not at the aggregate level very large, the observed heterogeneity at a more detailed 
level nevertheless raises the question how much does the selection matter for our main results. Thus, we 







Treated test statistics, Δ1 -0.0004 0.0094 0.0065
Untreated test statistics, Δ0 -0.0043 0.0006 -0.0003
Δ1 - Δ0 0.0039 0.0088* 0.0068
T-test statistic Δ1 - Δ0 0.6049 1.7952 1.1965
N (age 63, retires at 63) 6987 6987 6987
N (age 62, retires at 62) 1065 1065 1065
N (age 63, retires at 64) 4457 4457 4457
N (age 62, retires at 63) 6987 6987 6987
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Table 5. Aggregate homogeneity testing with fixed-effects. Note: Test statistics are based on Equations 5 and 6.
When we control for the individual-level fixed effects and use the age window 62-64 (Equations 5 and 6), we 
find that the test statistics are typically of moderate size (Table 5). For the probability of using antidepressants 
and requiring hospital treatments due to musculoskeletal diseases, the results indicate that the 
heterogeneity is rather small and statistically insignificant. In terms of the probability of facing a hospital 
treatment due to a cardiovascular disease, the test statistic indicates the possibility of heterogeneous 
treatment at the 10% significance level. 
Let us consider this result in more detail. The rejection of the homogeneous treatment hypothesis in the case 
of cardiovascular hospital treatments occurs because people aged 62 who retire at 62 are healthier than 
people aged 63 who retire at 63 when compared regarding their long-term average health . Thus, (𝛥1 > 0)
there seems to be selection toward early retirement. In contrast, people aged 62 who retire at 63 are typically 
as healthy as people aged 63 who retire at 64 .  The findings provide evidence of selection toward (𝛥0 ≈ 0)
retirement at the age 63, and because the treatment effects are heterogeneous among the different groups, 
the LATE health outcomes are likely to differ from the general population effects in the age window 62–64.
In terms of hospital treatments for musculoskeletal conditions, we find a similar pattern as with the hospital 
treatments for cardiovascular conditions, but the effect is smaller and insignificant. In terms of 
antidepressant use, we find weak signs that people who retire at 63 are typically less healthy at the age of 
62 than people aged 63 and retire only at 64, that is, . That said, people aged 62 who retire at 62 are 𝛥0 < 0
as healthy as people aged 63 who retire at 63 . Again, the size and significance of the impact is small. (𝛥1 ≈ 0)
In order to further understand our results, we next measure the individual test statistics without controlling 
for the individual-level fixed effects but otherwise according to Equations 5 and 6. In case of all health 
variables, we find that the null hypothesis of homogeneous treatment effect is rejected at the 1% confidence 
interval. Second, we define the untreated and treated test statistics,  and  respectively, beyond the age Δ0 Δ1,
interval 62-64:
Δ0 = 𝐸[ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡|𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  63 ,𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒 ≥   64] ― 𝐸[ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡|𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 62 , 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡 63]
= Δ0𝑎𝑔𝑒 + Δ0𝐸[𝛾𝑖] + Δ0𝐸[𝜖𝑖𝑡]      (8)
Δ1 = 𝐸[ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡|𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 63 ,𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡 63] ― 𝐸[ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡|𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 62 ,𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒 ≤  62]
= Δ1𝑎𝑔𝑒 + Δ1𝐸[𝛾𝑖] + Δ1𝐸[𝜖𝑖𝑡]      (9)
We again reject homogeneity for all health outcomes.14 
These results indicate that both the use of individual fixed effects to control for heterogeneity and limiting 
the observation window is important, and that once this has been done, the heterogeneity is of a moderate 
size. This finding is interesting, as it suggests that the results concerning health effects of retirement may not 
be generalizable if a standard RDD framework would be used without implementation of individual-specific 
fixed effects.15
14 We abstract from the details of these results, while hey are available upon request from the authors.
15 To further elaborate this point, we have also studied the characteristics of the compliers by comparing their health 
conditions to non-compliers in the spirit of Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 171). In particular, we study the ratio of the 
compliers’ probability of the adverse health outcome and the overall probability (compliers + non-compliers). Arguably, 
the most natural choice in our context is to make the comparison for (untreated) persons aged 62. As the complier 
group, we focus on persons who will retire at 63 and as the non-complier group on those who will retire at 64. For the 
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In order to further illustrate the role of different sub-groups in the homogeneity testing, we repeat the 
analysis also for them. First, we find that the joint hypothesis of homogeneity (chi-squared distributed F-test 
statistics with degrees of freedom equal to the number of sub-groups), as measured separately for each 
decomposition of the aggregate effect, can only be rejected for the cardiovascular hospital periods.   
While the aggregate results are in line with our previous analysis, the results of sub-group homogeneity 
testing in Table 6 shows that at the sub-group level there are a few interesting cases in which the 
homogeneity is rejected.  These cases involve single women and low-income women in case of the use of 
antidepressants, and the lowest income men and entrepreneurs in case of cardiovascular diseases. One 
explanation of this pattern is that these groups may self-select into retirement based on their expected health 
benefits or particularly strong trade-offs between health and income. In any case, the impact of these groups 
on the aggregate results seem to be limited.
Second stage and homogeneity tests















MEN Non-manual -0.0024 0.34 0.0098 0.66 -0.0244** 0.28
 Manual -0.0222*** 0.32 -0.0138 0.87 -0.0155 0.4
 Farmer -0.0731* 0.21 -0.0983* 0.11 0.0244 1.56
 (Other) entrepreneur -0.0074 0.21 -0.019 2.35** 0.0004 0.08
WOMEN Non-manual -0.0362*** 1.19 -0.0051 0.38 -0.0197* 1.43
 Manual -0.0685*** 0.33 -0.0075 0.7 -0.0292* 1.1
 Farmer -0.0887 1.23 -0.0248 0.24 0.0623 1.14
 (Other) entrepreneur -0.0472* 0.12 0.0031 4.4*** 0.005 0.84
  
MEN Single -0.019 0.21 0.0203 1.6 -0.0223 0.33
 Non-single -0.013** 0.07 -0.0156** 1.09 -0.0137* 0.07
WOMEN Single -0.0725*** 2.67*** -0.0147 0.59 -0.0165 0.25
 Non-single -0.0383*** 0.66 -0.0034 0.63 -0.0188* 1.47
 
MEN Income ≥ 75% -0.0002 0.29 -0.0481* 0.18 -0.0257 0.43
 75% > income ≥ 50% -0.0105 0.06 -0.0357 0.4 -0.0182 0.5
 50% > income ≥ 25% -0.034*** 0.19 0.0055 1.05 -0.0019 0.68
 25% > income -0.0044 0.11 -0.0086 2.43** -0.0211** 1.09
WOMEN Income ≥ 75% -0.038 0.93 0.0088 0.2 0.0393 0.12
 75% > income ≥ 50% -0.053*** 0.61 -0.0027 0.55 -0.0002 1.41
 50% > income ≥ 25% -0.0498*** 2.01** -0.0102 0.09 -0.0368*** 0.27
 25% > income -0.0461** 0.75 -0.0045 0.88 -0.0189 1.03
Table 6. Homogeneity testing for individual groups with fixed effects. Note: Test homogeneity statistics are based on Equations 5 and 
6 and they are calculated individually for each socio-economic group. The LATE estimates are based on Table 4.
The homogeneity testing provides only one source of information concerning the potential impact of 
selection. One way to further analyze our result is to study whether our results reflects selection through the 
short-term changes in health prior to retirement. To control for it, we include to our benchmark estimations 
use of antidepressants, hospital periods (cardiovascular), and hospital periods (musculoskeletal) the ratios are 1.0269, 
1.0597, and 1.0647, respectively. The results indicate that in the group of compliers the probability of the adverse health 
conditions tends to be marginally higher than in the group of non-compliers.
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(in Table 3) the measures of other health outcomes one year prior to the retirement as additional control 
variables in the specification “Previous year's other health outcomes as additional controls” in Table A3. We 
find that our aggregate results are not sensitive to the inclusion of this additional information, again 
suggesting that the aggregate LATE findings are robust. We exclude the lagged dependent variable from the 
estimations, as its inclusion would lead into inconsistent estimation.16
In addition, we have also used coarsened exact matching algorithm to preprocess our data. This is in order 
to avoid the potentially confounding influence of pre-treatment control variables, and thus reducing 
imbalance between the treated and control groups. We balance our dataset in terms of gender, socio-
economic groups, family status, and income groups for a sub-panel of persons that are retired at the age 64. 
When we repeat the benchmark analysis (in Table 3) in the specification “Estimation after matching”, we find 
that the selection appears not to influence our findings.17
Finally, it should be noted that in the benchmark analysis we stratified data by focusing on the retirement 
transitions that we argue best represent the different elements of the retirement transitions.  However, to 
ensure that our results are not due to the stratification, we repeat the analysis by considering retirements 
that may also involve unemployment before the retirement, or part-time continuation of work after the 
retirement in the specification “All retirements included” in Table A3. We find that the results are roughly 
half a percentage point larger in case of antidepressants use, while for other health variables the effect of 
using the full data either moderately increases (cardiovascular diseases) or has very small effect on the result 
(musculoskeletal diseases). All in all, we find that these moderate effects are consistent with our finding that 
selection does not have a major role in our aggregate results
6.2. Timing of the retirement effect
Our benchmark analysis shows results for a specific choice of the timing of the retirement effect. We estimate 
the average effect of retirement to the health variable at the year that follows the retirement and thereafter. 
This choice is natural as the amount of work that a person has done during his or her retirement year can 
vary, and it is not clearly specified in our data. 
However, in order to analyze the robustness of our results in terms of timing, we also repeat our study by 
using the health outcomes that are measured at the year of retirement as the explained variable (instead of 
considering them at the year that follows the retirement in Table 3) in the specification “Contemporaneous 
effect of retirement” in Table A3. We find that the results remain very similar despite the change in the 
timing.18
16 However, we have also conducted dynamic GMM panel estimations of the reduced-form model with several lags of 
the dependent variable as additional controls, while using the benchmark set of other control variables. We find that 
in each case the health effects are in line with our previous findings. In particular, we find that the effect on the 
antidepressant use is significantly negative and of similar size with our main results, while we do not find evidence of 
weak identification in the estimation context. The results are also significant for other health variables, but the 
instrument set may suffer from weakness.
17 As in some cases we find evidence against generality of our LATE estimates, it is natural to ask, whether we could 
use alternative methods to make inferences on the ATE. For example, bivariate probit models could be used to 
estimate unconditional average causal effects under additional identifying assumptions (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
While our results based on the experimentation of the bivariate probit model indicate towards a positive effect, and 
this perspective would be highly interesting, we have not been able to include the large-scale panel structure of our 
data to the model, and thus further analysis in this direction remains to be done in the future work.
18 A potential caveat of our analysis is that we cannot isolate whether the contemporaneous (t=0) effects are due to 
retirement or work in the year of retirement. This result suggest that the results do not change much due to the 
timing change, and thus we consider this not to be a major problem.
22
More generally, we illustrate the dynamics of the health effects over time by simultaneously estimating the 
health impacts of retirement for a broader time window. We estimate the effect each year in an interval that 
spans over a time period of 3 years before and 3 years after the retirement. Formally, we change Equations 
2 and 3 to




𝛽1𝑘 𝑠𝑝(𝑘)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡        (10)
and




𝛼1𝑘𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘 +  𝛼2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,    (11)
after denoting  as an indicator variable that receives a value of 1 if  and receives a value 𝑠𝑝(𝑘)𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘 ≥ 𝑠𝑝𝑖
of 0 when , and  are the predictions of  from the first stage, with 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘 < 𝑠𝑝𝑖 𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘 𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘 𝑠𝑝( ― 3)𝑖𝑡,…,
used as excluded instruments. 19   𝑠𝑝(3)𝑖𝑡 
In the dynamic model, we simplify the specification in order to strike a balance between the increased level 
of detail due to the dynamics and the level of detail of other features. Accordingly, we use a single, quadratic 
time path before and after the retirement for the full population, while we simultaneously estimate 
differentiated dynamic effects for male and female retirees. We concentrate on the retirements that 
occurred between the years 2005-2009 in order to focus on full paths of the transition dynamics within our 
time window. We include year-dummies and use clustered error terms, as before.
In Figure 2 and Figure 3 we show the percentage point deviation of the probabilities of the health events 
from the common time trend in the reduced-form model (collecting the coefficients of ’s) and the IV 𝛽1𝑘
model (collecting ’s), correspondingly. 𝛼1𝑘
19 We find that extending the estimation window, , beyond 3, results in failure to reject the weakness test of the 𝑘
instruments. When , we find that the p-values for rejecting the underidentification are very close to 0.  We find 𝑘 = 3
that the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic related to the weakness of the instruments vary between 5 and 6 in the 
dynamic case, suggesting that they are close to the benchmark critical values provided by Stock and Yogo (2005). 
While it should be acknowledged that the critical values do not fully correspond to the current specification, the 
results raise the possibility of weakness of the instruments.
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Figure 2. The reduced-form dynamics of the health effects over time. Note: We simultaneously estimate the reduced-form health 
impacts of retirement for each year in an interval that spans over the period 3 years before and after the retirement for women and 
men. The reported effects are ’s in equation  Robust 𝛽1𝑘 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑
𝑘 = 3
𝑘 = ―3𝛽1𝑘 𝑠𝑝(𝑘)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝑔𝑒
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡.
standard errors for heterogeneity and person-level clusters in the error terms, grey are is the 95 % confidence interval. In the results, 
y-axis denotes the % risk of using antidepressants or facing a hospital period. Other control variables: year- and individual-specific 
fixed effects and a quadratic aging trend.
Figure 3. The IV estimation of the dynamics of the health effects of retirement. Note: We simultaneously estimate the IV health impacts 
of retirement for each year in an interval that spans over the period 3 years before and after the retirement for women and men. The 
reported effects are ’s in Equation 11: Robust standard 𝛼1𝑘 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑
𝑘 = 3
𝑘 = ―3𝛼1𝑘𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘 + 𝛼2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝑔𝑒
2
𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡. 
errors for heterogeneity and person-level clusters in the error terms, grey are is the 95 % confidence interval. In the results, y-axis 
denotes the % risk of using antidepressants or facing a hospital period. Other control variables: year- and industry-specific fixed effects 
and a quadratic aging trend.
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We find that the estimates of the effect for a single year include a considerable amount of uncertainty that 
may reflect both the difficulty of making exact inferences on the dynamics and the heterogeneous effects 
across the socio-economic groups.  Nevertheless, some dynamic features strike us as statistically and 
economically significant.  
First, the women’s risk of using antidepressants decreases sharply after the retirement as relative to the 
control group; an effect that is somewhat reversed in the later years according to the IV -estimates. The 
magnitude of the effect based on the IV estimates is substantial, roughly 10 percentage points, for the 
persons who retire as a result of reaching the age of 63, whereas the reduced-form estimate is only around 
1 percentage points. This number is feasible when compared to the population level overall decline at the 
age 63, while findings suggest that the first stage is even smaller than in the baseline estimations, thus limiting 
even further the group of persons who retires as a result of crossing the threshold age. For men, the pattern 
is similar, but weaker, consistently with our previous results. 
For other health variables, the effects are more diffused and slower to emerge. In case of musculoskeletal 
diseases, the declining effect is still relatively strongly linked to the retirement, whereas for cardiovascular 
diseases the effect starts only a few years after the retirement.  Interestingly, we find that among men 
retirement may even have an initial, increasing effect on the possibility of cardiovascular diseases. 
Interestingly, in contrast to Heller-Sahlgren (2017), we do not find any negative longer-term effects of 
retirement, albeit that our maximum length of the effect is only 3 years after the retirement.
6.3. Alternative aging profiles and “Placebo” effects
Correct characterization of the underlying aging trend is important part of our analysis. The discontinuity 
caused by the statutory age acts as instruments for individuals’ retirement status in a 2SLS model, but only if 
it is properly identified by using age as the continuous variable determining the discontinuities. We next study 
in more detail the robustness and validity of this approach.
In the baseline analysis, we use the panel structure of our data, and estimate the impact of aging by using 
quadratic aging trends and all available data of the treatment group. This is somewhat different from the 
standard RDD framework in which the estimation window in terms of the running variable is chosen 
according to an optimization procedure. Moreover, a linear model is typically used to control for the effect 
of changes in the running variable in the vicinity of the cutoff.  
It is notable that we cannot follow this approach because the running variable is not continuous, but rather 
it is characterized by few discrete mass points constituted by the yearly observations. In absence of the 
possibility to optimize the size of the estimation window, we instead repeat the analysis for different sizes of 
the estimation window to analyse the sensitivity of our results to it. We first conduct the analysis in the 
smallest age window 62–64 around the statutory retirement age while controlling for the age effects with a 
linear time trend. The results are reported in Table in the row “Estimation at the age window [62,64]”. 
Moreover, we repeat the analysis for a moderately larger age window 61-65 in the row “Estimation at the 
age window [61,65]”.  
We find that the main results are robust to changes in the age window, while the effect of retirement on the 
use of antidepressants is moderately decreased when the smaller estimation window is used.
Another useful way to check the validity of our results is to test whether in the age 63 there is a discontinuity 
in the health profiles of persons who do not retire near this age. If such a discontinuity is observed, it would 
invalidate our analysis, as it would suggest that there is a direct health effect of turning 63, and thus other 
factors than retirement would be likely to explain our results. If instead, the effect is missing, that would 
provide additional confirmation to the validity of our approach. Accordingly, we conduct this “Placebo” test 
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by repeating the reduced-form baseline analysis for persons who retire before they turn 61, or after they 
have turned 65.
The results of the “Placebo” estimation are reported in Table 7. In support of our previous analysis, we find 
only small and insignificant effects of turning 63 on health for persons who do not retire at or near this age, 
when the direct effect of age is controlled similarly to our baseline analysis.
Use of antidepressants Hospital periods (cardiovascular) Hospital periods (musculoskeletal)
Reduced form    
Effect of turning 63, α1 -0.0010 0.0035 0.0016
SE 0.0031 0.0027 0.0032
N (obs.) 58482 58482 58482
N (persons) 4907 4907 4907
Table 7. Placebo testing. Note: The table shows the benchmark reduced-form estimates when estimation is based on the health data 
of persons who retire before turning 61, or after turning 65. Robust standard errors for heterogeneity and person-level clusters in 
the error terms in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. In the results, -0.01 denotes a 1 percentage point decrease in the 
risk of using antidepressants or facing a hospital period when retired. Other control variables: year- and individual-specific fixed 
effects and step-wise quadratic aging trend.
7. Conclusions
Our objective in this study is to determine whether retirement from work to old-age pension influences 
various health indicators, and whether this impact differs by sex, occupational social class and income. A 
unique aspect of the data is that they are fully based on administrative registers, have a large sample size 
and no self-report or selective participation bias. 
We find that retirement moderately decreases the use of antidepressants, especially for women. The effect 
is sharp, while it is somewhat reversed in the later years. The beneficial effects of retirement on the 
cardiovascular and musculoskeletal conditions are smaller and more diffused. Our results show a reduction 
in antidepressant use for women in almost all occupations, whereas for men the effect is significant only for 
manual workers and farmers, while the effects are much smaller for the other occupational categories. 
Moreover, we find stronger declines in the anti-depressant use among men and women who retire from low- 
and mid-income work, as well as more robust decrease in the risk of cardiovascular diseases for men in the 
highest income jobs and for non-single men.
We use the individual fixed-effects instrumental variable method to ensure causality. The lowest eligibility 
age for old-age pensions provides us with a strong instrument. The longitudinal register data allow us to 
follow the employment statuses and health of each person years before and after he or she retires and 
thereby precisely separate the transition from work to old-age retirement. The institutional structure of the 
Finnish pension scheme improves the coverage of the results. The first pillar earnings-related pension scheme 
dominates retirement behaviour, since the second pillar occupational pensions and third pillar individual 
pensions with their different retirement rules are marginal. Overall, we use new methods to evaluate 
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external validity – the results imply that the beneficial effects of retirement on the antidepressant use can 
be extended to apply to most Finns retiring from the private sector at ages 62–64. 
Many of the previous studies, including some that use the Finnish data, did not detect an effect of old age 
retirement on mental health. Our study finds a positive influence of retirement on the purchase of 
antidepressants; this also applies to ages other than the earliest retirement age for full pension. Similar 
positive results have been found in different institutional settings, such as in Australia and Japan and the UK. 
These associations may reflect short-term honeymoon effects, and analyses of longer-term effects are called 
for. Our results highlight the importance of using high quality data and robust identification strategy in 
analysis, but also warns that there are potential selection problems in the standard quasi-experimental 
research design, at least in case of some health outcomes and socioeconomic groups. 
In summary, even though the estimation results were largely conclusive in terms of statistical significance, 
the benefits of retirement on health were rather small and limited at the studied age window. On the one 
hand, our results imply that encouraging retirement may not be the most efficient policy to reduce the 
common health conditions among older workers. On the other hand, we argue that policy efforts to increase 
the retirement age only carry a relatively modest health penalty at the population level, albeit there are some 
socioeconomic groups that are affected more strongly.
Appendix
Additional tables
 Data Country Health variables Retirement  heterogeneity Main method Instruments Health effect of retirement
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Increase in costs and 
utilization, negative for health
Table A1. Characteristics of recent studies. SR= self-reported.
First stage
β1 SE F -test N (obs) N (people)
MEN Non-manual 0.3167*** 0.0084 1405 44,091 3,700
Manual 0.3968*** 0.0093 1815 38,214 3,212
Farmer 0.1912*** 0.0196 95 8,080 678
(Other) entrepreneur 0.3545*** 0.0134 698 18,921 1,588
WOMEN Non-manual 0.2952*** 0.0072 1690 60,099 5,023
Manual 0.3285*** 0.0104 989 26,866 2,246
Farmer 0.2042*** 0.0264 60 4,069 342
(Other) entrepreneur 0.3108*** 0.0182 291 10,125 846
MEN Single 0.3094*** 0.014 486 16,640 2,144
Non-single 0.345*** 0.006 3320 92,666 8,357
WOMEN Single 0.2591*** 0.0099 684 28,873 3,215
Non-single 0.3157*** 0.0067 2191 72,286 6,882
MEN Income ≥ 75% 0.3205*** 0.0196 267 9,111 769
75% > income ≥ 50% 0.3166*** 0.0171 341 11,383 958
28
50% > income ≥ 25% 0.3614*** 0.0105 1187 29,508 2,478
25% > income 0.3459*** 0.0075 2138 58,709 4,919
WOMEN Income ≥ 75% 0.2734*** 0.0183 224 9,220 771
75% > income ≥ 50% 0.3469*** 0.0113 938 22,793 1,907
50% > income ≥ 25% 0.3089*** 0.0086 1296 41,740 3,487
25% > income 0.2649*** 0.0111 568 27,031 2,259









LATE, α1/β1 SE LATE, α1/β1 SE LATE, α1/β1 SE β1 SE F -test N (obs)
N 
(persons)
Previous year's (other) health outcomes as 
controls -0.0305*** 0.0050 -0.008* 0.0048 -0.0163*** 0.0053 0.1693*** 0.0052 6879 210465 17635
Contemporaneous effect of retirement -0.0354*** 0.0076 -0.0113* 0.0062 -0.0195*** 0.0064 0.2146*** 0.0051 5554 228126 17635
All retirements included -0.0346*** 0.0031 -0.0048 0.003 -0.0163*** 0.003 -0.0375*** 0.0022 26204 1054824 92731
The aggregate effect on men -0.0146** 0.0057 -0.0099 0.0071 -0.0149** 0.0066 0.2024*** 0.0074 3887 109306 9178
The aggregate effect on women -0.0497*** 0.0087 -0.0058 0.0062 -0.0178** 0.0086 0.1329*** 0.0074 3003 101159 8457
Estimation after matching -0.0394*** 0.0113 -0.0144 0.013 -0.0226 0.0139 0.3124*** 0.004 951 188682 15799
Estimation at the age window [62,64] -0.0261*** 0.0073 -0.0096 0.0088 -0.0195* 0.01 0.2869*** 0.0045 4037 51053 17632
Estimation at the age window [61,65] -0.0202*** 0.0053 -0.0088 0.0059 -0.0141** 0.0067 0.323*** 0.0040 6399 81808 17634
Table A3. Robustness analysis. IV estimation of the aggregate effect of retirement on health. Note:  In the results, -0.01 denotes a 1 
percentage point decrease in the risk of using antidepressants or facing a hospital period when retired. Robust standard errors for 
heterogeneity and person-level clusters in the error terms in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Varying specifications.
Retires at 63 Others Frequency of the condition,when retires at 63


















AVERAGE 100 % 100 % 64.2 5.5 % 2.2 % 3.0 % 5.1 % 2.3 % 3.2 %
MEN 55.5 % 49.8 % 64.3 2.9 % 1.8 % 2.3 % 2.8 % 2.2 % 2.5 %
WOMEN 44.5 % 50.2 % 64.1 7.3 % 1.4 % 2.7 % 6.3 % 1.3 % 2.5 %
100 % 100 %
MEN Non-manual 20.0 % 21.6 % 64.1 4.3 % 2.8 % 2.4 % 4.4 % 2.7 % 2.5 %
Manual 21.7 % 15.9 % 64.3 3.2 % 2.5 % 3.5 % 2.7 % 3.5 % 3.7 %
Farmer 3.2 % 4.2 % 65.0 3.1 % 2.7 % 1.8 % 1.8 % 2.4 % 3.1 %
(Other) enterpreneur 10.6 % 8.0 % 64.7 3.4 % 2.2 % 3.9 % 2.7 % 3.8 % 2.8 %
WOMEN Non-manual 25.5 % 30.5 % 63.9 8.1 % 1.8 % 2.9 % 7.9 % 1.5 % 3.4 %
Manual 12.2 % 13.1 % 64.2 7.8 % 1.3 % 3.8 % 5.0 % 1.6 % 3.8 %
Farmer 1.6 % 2.2 % 64.9 4.5 % 2.7 % 0.0 % 5.7 % 2.6 % 3.9 %
(Other) enterpreneur 5.2 % 4.5 % 64.6 7.9 % 2.5 % 2.2 % 6.0 % 1.5 % 3.3 %
100.0 % 100.0 %
MEN Single 8.7 % 8.3 % 64.5 4.4 % 2.8 % 2.0 % 4.5 % 4.0 % 2.9 %
29
Non-single 46.8 % 41.5 % 64.3 3.5 % 2.5 % 3.3 % 3.1 % 2.9 % 3.0 %
WOMEN Single 12.0 % 16.2 % 64.3 11.2 % 1.7 % 3.8 % 8.9 % 1.4 % 4.2 %
Non-single 32.5 % 34.0 % 64.0 6.6 % 1.8 % 2.6 % 5.9 % 1.6 % 3.2 %
100.0 % 100.0 %
MEN Income ≥ 75 % 4.8 % 4.1 % 64.5 3.0 % 2.1 % 1.5 % 2.5 % 1.8 % 1.6 %
75 % > income ≥ 50 % 5.6 % 5.4 % 64.3 4.3 % 2.6 % 2.8 % 3.4 % 4.2 % 2.8 %
50 % > income ≥ 25 % 15.3 % 13.4 % 64.2 3.8 % 2.6 % 3.6 % 3.2 % 4.0 % 3.8 %
25 % > income 29.8 % 26.9 % 64.4 3.6 % 2.6 % 3.1 % 3.6 % 2.6 % 2.8 %
WOMEN Income ≥ 75 % 4.1 % 4.6 % 64.4 4.9 % 2.8 % 2.4 % 5.8 % 1.7 % 3.3 %
75 % > income ≥ 50 % 10.5 % 11.1 % 64.1 7.4 % 2.2 % 3.2 % 7.0 % 1.3 % 2.9 %
50 % > income ≥ 25 % 18.5 % 20.7 % 64.0 8.3 % 1.5 % 3.3 % 6.9 % 1.6 % 3.5 %
25 % > income 11.4 % 13.8 % 64.0 8.7 % 1.4 % 2.3 % 7.3 % 1.6 % 4.0 %
100.0 % 100.0 %
Table A4. Characterization of persons who retire at 63 in the treatment group, as compared to all other persons in the treatment 
group. Note: All variables are measured one year before retirement.















55 60 65 70
Age
Figure 4. Aggregate frequency of antidepressant use (black line), prediction of the reduced-form model (red line) and its 95% 
confidence interval (grey area). The blue line denotes the counterfactual age profile without the effect of turning 63. Note: Robust 
standard errors for heterogeneity and person-level clusters in the error terms. In the results, y-axis denotes the % risk of using 















55 60 65 70
Age
Figure 5. Aggregate frequency of cardiovascular treatment episodes (black line), prediction of the reduced-form model (red line) and 
its 95% confidence interval (grey area). The blue line denotes the counterfactual age profile without the effect of turning 63. Note: 
Robust standard errors for heterogeneity and person-level clusters in the error terms. In the results, y-axis denotes the % risk of using 




















55 60 65 70
Age
Figure 6. Aggregate frequency of musculoskeletal treatment episodes (black line), prediction of the reduced-form model (red line) and 
its 95% confidence interval (grey area). The blue line denotes the counterfactual age profile without the effect of turning 63. Note: 
Robust standard errors for heterogeneity and person-level clusters in the error terms. In the results, y-axis denotes the % risk of using 
antidepressants or facing a hospital period. Other control variables: year- and individual-specific fixed effects and step-wise quadratic 
aging trend.
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55 60 65 70
Age
Entrepreneur and female
Figure 7. Aggregate frequency of antidepressant use by socioeconomic group (black line), prediction of the reduced-form model (red 
line) and its 95% confidence interval (grey area). The blue line denotes the counterfactual age profile without the effect of turning 63. 
Note: Robust standard errors for heterogeneity and person-level clusters in the error terms. In the results, y-axis denotes the % risk of 





























































































































55 60 65 70
Age
Entrepreneur and female
Figure 8. Aggregate frequency of cardiovascular treatment episodes (black line), prediction of the reduced-form model (red line) and 
its 95% confidence interval (grey area). The blue line denotes the counterfactual age profilel without the effect of turning 63. Note: 
Robust standard errors for heterogeneity and person-level clusters in the error terms. In the results, y-axis denotes the % risk of using 




















































































































55 60 65 70
Age
Entrepreneur and female
Figure 9. Frequency of musculoskeletal treatment episodes by socioeconomic group (black line), prediction of the reduced-form model 
(red line) and its 95% confidence interval (grey area). The blue line denotes the counterfactual age profile without the effect of turning 
63. Note: Robust standard errors for heterogeneity and person-level clusters in the error terms. In the results, y-axis denotes the % 
risk of using antidepressants or facing a hospital period. Other control variables: year- and individual-specific fixed effects and step-
wise quadratic aging trend.
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